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Abstract
Recent disclosures of failures of care in the National Health Service (NHS) in England have led to debates 
about compassion deficits disallowing health professionals to provide high quality responsive care. While the 
link between high quality care and compassion is often taken for granted, it is less obvious how compassion 
– often originating in the individual’s emotional response – can become a moral sentiment and lead to 
developing a system of norms and values underpinning ethics of care. In this editorial, I argue why and how 
compassion might become a foundation of ethics guiding health professionals and a basis for ethics of care 
in health service organisations. I conclude by discussing a recent case of prominent healthcare failure in the 
NHS to highlight the relationship between compassion as an aspect of professional ethics on the one hand, and 
values and norms that institutions and specific policies promote on the other hand.
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Introduction 
The issue of compassion in healthcare has been examined 
from a variety of perspectives including psychology, ethics, 
health education and policy (1–3).  Prompted by the recent 
disclosures of failures of care in the National Health Service 
(NHS) in England (4,5), this debate has been centred on 
compassion as an individual attribute enabling health 
professionals to provide high quality responsive care. Several 
professional bodies are now actively working on developing 
guidelines in order to promote more patient-centred care. The 
role of compassion in health service delivery (6) is central to 
many of these deliberations.
Gilbert and Choden (7) define compassion as the “sensitivity 
to suffering in self and others with a commitment to try to alleviate 
and prevent it”. Drawing on psychological literature their 
primary focus is on the motivation of individuals (8) but for 
healthcare professionals compassion is more about relational 
interpersonal practice (9). There is evidence that being cared 
for by compassionate clinicians increases and speeds up 
recovery (8). In addition, when clinicians feel themselves to 
be compassionately treated by their organisation and each 
other, they are more robust, creative and more open (6). The 
role of compassion in contemporary healthcare systems is 
increasingly important for both practice and policy: it is a 
social phenomenon that ‘shapes and is shaped by conditions of 
inequality and coercion’ (9) extending to the notions of social 
justice and solidarity (10). 
While the link between high quality care and compassion is 
often taken for granted, it is less obvious how compassion – 
often originating in the individual’s emotional response – can 
become a moral sentiment and lead to developing a system of 
norms and values underpinning ethics of care (1). Furthermore, 
conflating compassion or other virtues such as empathy with 
being a good healthcare professional does not accurately reflect 
health service reality since care can mean either to feel a certain 
way or to carry out certain activities (11). While it undoubtedly 
contributes to a high quality therapeutic relationship (12,13), 
responsive care cannot and should not be delivered by relying 
on health professionals’ empathy and compassion only. Health 
policy objectives and organisational structures supporting 
them matter as much or even more sincesocial structures and 
context might either foster or impede it. 
Below, I outline how compassion might become a foundation of 
ethics guiding health professionals and a basis for ethics of care 
in health services in organisations. I conclude by discussing 
a recent case of prominent healthcare failure in the NHS in 
England to highlight the relationship between compassion as 
an aspect of professional ethics on the one hand, and values 
and norms that institutions and specific policies promote on 
the other hand. 
Compassion as a foundation of ethics 
Philosophers’ have taken diametrically different views on the 
role of compassion in ethics. Overall, there are conceptual 
issues and uncertainty over whether care and compassion can 
fit into ethics and moral philosophy (14). For Kant, ethics are 
rule-bound while all morality derives from essential dignity 
and the autonomy of rational human beings. Only morality 
based on rules and reason can lead to freedom, choice, 
discernment and decision-making based on reason (15). 
Schopenhauer – along with his philosophical hero David 
Hume – was one of the first Western philosophers to emphasise 
compassion as the basis of morality - thus rejecting Kant and 
the neo-Kantian tradition (16). MacIntyre in turn refuses the 
enlightenment philosophers’ tendency (including Hume) to 
project their own morality as ‘universal’ sense of morals and a 
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normative standard (17). 
Yet the contribution of Kant to ethics of care in a healthcare 
context is important. The main novelty of his philosophy is as 
Ross explains (2008): ‘his ‘Copernican Revolution’, that, as he 
puts it, is the representation that makes the object possible rather 
than the object that makes the representation possible’ (15). The 
basis of Kant’s morality where understanding of ethics has to 
do with perceiving (18) has potentially useful implications 
for inculcating compassion through health education: It 
suggests that as much as caring is an activity that can be learnt, 
perceiving the moral dimension of medical practice is also a 
skill that can be acquired to a greater or lesser extent (1).
Feminists raised their objections against philosophy 
articulated in terms of a male discourse and have argued 
for rethinking the whole male-dominated, principle-driven 
Western tradition in ethics (19) through the prism of care. 
Carol Gilligan’s In a Different Voice offered the perspective 
that men and women have tendencies to view morality 
in different terms (20). The embodied ethical caring that 
women are more likely to follow has the potential to provide 
a more concrete ethical rules as compared to the abstract 
ethics of justice that is associated with male constructs 
(19,20). More recently, Judith Butler, a feminist post-
structuralist philosopher rehabilitated the role of affect 
further by focusing on the role of passionate attachments 
to social norms (21), which play a big role in healthcare 
arising from the material reality of ailing bodies. Such 
ethics of care in a healthcare context would denote a shift 
from dependency towards interdependency, offering an 
emancipatory perspective that defies the notion of passive 
acquiescence that is conventionally associated with being a 
patient (22). Last but not least, the psychosocial approaches 
in feminism stress the political importance of compassion 
that exceeds the sphere of individual intimacy (23). Only such 
an approach that acknowledges the interrelation between 
individual motivation and the social structure can serve as the 
foundation of compassion-based ethics of care proposed by 
political theorists (10). Trento thus argues for building caring 
institutions through a political process that considers the 
needs, contributions, and prospects of many different actors. 
Individual versus organisational ethics of care
There is recognition of the role compassion plays in health 
professionals’ individual morality (2) but it often appears to be 
in conflict with organisational logics and policies. As Poppke 
argues with reference to Lévinas: ‘the question that arises is 
how can we live up to the demands of ethics and responsibility 
in a world held together by an array of impersonal organisations, 
institutions, and forms of discursive power?’ (p. 505) (24).
Compassion that is a necessary basis for ethical foundation of 
care might arise from bodily affects and emotions but as an 
individual pre-moral sentiment on its own it cannot ensure 
responsive care. This is because sympathy—an emotion—
that drives helping behaviour is all too often lacking in the 
situations where it is most warranted and, when aroused, is 
prone to direct the helping behaviour it motivates in erratic, 
inefficient, and irrational directions (25). For compassion to 
play a fundamental role in ethics of care, a specific relation 
between emotion and reason on the one hand and the 
relation to other persons on the other (1) is required. As I 
have argued with reference to trust, affect gives meaning to 
rational considerations about objective measures concerning 
incentives underpinning health system or quality of care thus 
enabling the systemic trust (22). Thus, we place an expectation 
in (unknown) doctors to display compassion because of our 
shared humanity (identification based trust). But we also 
rely on their professional duty of care and non-malfeasance 
as well as the knowledge that they have no incentives to act 
otherwise in publicly funded system that institutional trust 
in the abstract capacities of the system bolsters. Policies and 
organisational structures reinforcing or destroying systemic 
and/or interpersonal trust can have a very similar effect on 
compassion in healthcare. 
The widely discussed Francis Report (4), identifying 
‘the need to change a culture focused on doing the system’s 
business – not that of patients’ (p. 4) is a key lesson from 
Staffordshire hospital’s tragic neglect of patients care in 
another such example. The Mid Staffordshire NHS Trust 
failures in rudimentary aspects of care and the widespread 
and systemic patient abuse taking place in the hospital 
[involving leaving dying patients hungry, soiled and in pain 
for hours see (5)] is extreme but not unusual. It was shown to 
be a direct result of giving priority to demonstrating ‘financial 
health’ by the hospital. As the hospital’s management embarked 
on cutting costs in this specific case, the staffing requirements 
needed to provide adequate patient care, and arguably the 
patients themselves, were ultimately seen as ‘getting in the way’ 
of achieving the hospital’s strategic goal. The Francis Report 
provides a damning indictment of such an approach: ‘While the 
system as a whole appeared to pay lip service to the need not to 
compromise services and their quality, it is remarkable how little 
attention was paid to the potential impact of proposed savings 
on quality and safety’ (4) (p. 45). Nurses were working 12-hour 
shifts and were often replaced by less qualified assistants in 
order to decrease costs (3).
But how could managers or even the frontline staff distance 
themselves from the obvious task of providing care to the 
point of criminal negligence? Though moral responsibility 
for any action rests ultimately with the individual, the 
widespread failing in care standards cannot be simply 
attributed to callous and uncaring staff. Recent research 
suggests how almost anyone might engage in unethical 
behaviour, thanks to a complicated and socially reinforced 
mix of organisational and individual factors having to do 
with mental framing, perceptions and unconscious motives 
(26). Furthermore, organisational theory indicates that when 
explicit targets are coupled with strong incentives (and/or 
disincentives), individuals will often strive to meet them at the 
expense of a common sense (27). This could sometimes even 
lead to them violating socially accepted norms (28) as they are 
working towards meeting impersonal organisational targets 
(29). However, compassion can be cultivated through training 
that increases altruistic behaviour in compassion trainees via 
neural mechanisms controlling emotion prompting them to 
respond to rather than avoid suffering of others (30).
The proposal to incentivise compassion proposed by the 
UK government to address the failures of care (3) will not 
succeed if it is not geared to promote prosocial behaviour 
but rather to implement target measures that have induced 
the failure of compassion in the first place. It might also 
impose a whole new set of burdens on the health services 
(11) if health professionals are required to meet newly 
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proposed compassion targets with resources being further 
diverted towards the management, measurement and 
monitoring of compassion. The issue therefore is not the 
absence of compassion by doctors and nurses per se but how 
organisational cultures, policies and politics might exert 
a damaging influence on caring values (2). Shift towards 
impersonal surveillance systems coupled with cost savings 
measures imposed by those who are distanced from the reality 
of care militates against developing compassionate caring 
institutions. Put differently, codes of ethics along with the 
lengthy socialisation process into the norms and values of 
the profession might be difficult to adhere to when resources 
are squeezed and norms and values are altered. Policies must 
reflect this reality to avoid undesirable consequences of the 
lack of compassion in health services that is antithetical to the 
idea of care. 
Conclusion
Providing adequate training to healthcare professionals 
proposed by the UK government to remedy poor care and 
neglect may be an effective way of ensuring that nurses and 
doctors treat their patients with compassion only if it is 
followed by specific measures and policies that will nurture 
and develop such attitudes. Managers and organisations 
are critical to the creation of an ethical environment but 
the overall policy framework in which they operate is even 
more important. Recognising the importance of compassion 
as an inherent aspect of care does not only require explicit 
incorporation of ethical training as part of health education 
(1). Painstaking and systematic implementation of relevant 
policies in the context of institutional healthcare settings 
is essential for embedding and cultivating compassionate 
attitudes in health professionals. 
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